Infanticide defended by so-called ethicists
The Journal of Medical Ethics calls itself “an international peer-reviewed journal for health professionals and researchers in medical ethics” — which proves that grandiose titles can be worthless.
Under the heading of Law, ethics and medicine, the journal prints a paper co-authored by former Oxford University ethicist Dr. Francesca Minerva and Dr. Alberto Giubilini, a bioethicist from the University of Milan, titled “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?”
In the report published by the BMJ (British Medical Journal) both newborns and pre-born human life are referred to as “potential persons,” as the duo opines that “the moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus, that is, neither can be considered a ‘person’ in a morally relevant sense. It is not possible to damage a newborn by preventing her from developing the potentiality to become a person in the morally relevant sense.”
In case the point was missed, repeated closely on its heels is this: “The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus in the sense that both lack those properties that justify the attribution of a right to life to an individual.”
The so-called ethicists argue that “after-birth abortion” should be permissible in all cases in which abortion is, stating that like an unborn child, a newborn has yet to develop hopes, goals and dreams — the baby is not a person in the truest sense — someone with a moral right to life. In contrast, parents, siblings and society have aims and plans that could be negatively affected by the arrival of the child and their interests should take priority.
Adoption as an alternative is belittled. Minerva and Giubilini write: “Indeed, however weak the interests of actual people can be, they will always trump the alleged interest of potential people to become actual ones, because this latter interest amounts to zero. On this perspective, the interests of the actual people involved matter, and among these interests, we also need to consider the interests of the mother who might suffer psychological distress from giving her child up for adoption.”
According to this rationale, murder would be far less distressing to the mother than allowing her child to live in a family ready to provide a loving home.
Reading the dispassionate arguments for death, we are witnessing the slippery slope of marginalizing life from natural birth through natural death as it becomes a hedonistic avalanche.